Allow
Within mandate, within budget, within scope. It proceeds — and is signed and recorded anyway.
The enterprise is about to hand real systems, real budgets and real money to fleets of AI agents. authoxi decides what each one may do — identity, permissions, usage, money — enforces it at every action, and keeps a signed record of who approved what.
One POST returns a live key — no account, no card, no sales call
ed25519 passports · signed mandates · hard budget caps · never a key vault
Watch the escalation get approved. Sample fleet — the four outcomes, the signing and the resolve are the real ones.
Within mandate, within budget, within scope. It proceeds — and is signed and recorded anyway.
It stops, with a reason code an operator can debug from — not a 403 and a shrug.
A named human signs, with their own key. Non-repudiable, and the agent waits.
Not yet — and here is what would change that. The agent steps up and retries, in one call.
Treating the fourth as a denial is the single easiest mistake to make against this API, so it is a separate exception type rather than a subclass — and there is a test that proves it.
May this actor do this, right now — and who is accountable?
Identity has always assumed one kind of actor and split the work three ways: SSO asks right human?, CAPTCHA asks not a bot?, API keys were how machines snuck in. Agents act as a chain — human → agent → sub-agent → action — and the three old questions collapse into one that nobody owns.
An Ed25519 keypair and a short-lived, offline-verifiable did:key passport. Proof-of-possession — we never see the private key, so we cannot impersonate your agent and neither can anyone who breaches us.
Scoped, signed, revocable access to connected systems — GitHub, Stripe, MCP servers — clamped three ways: grant ⊆ role ⊆ tenant guardrail.
Inference and execution budgets enforced at credential issuance. Over budget means no passport refresh, so an agent is cut off without us sitting on the inference path.
Signed mandates with hard caps, and Ed25519-signed, non-repudiable human approval for high-stakes spend.
A sub-agent cannot be granted more than its parent holds, and cannot outlive it. That is checked at issuance, not documented as a guideline.
pip install authoxi. No account, no key of ours. Your agent signs what it did and anyone can verify it offline.
Shadow mode records what it WOULD have refused. Nothing breaks while you find out what your fleet actually does.
Promote the mandate the shadow period proposed. Now the four outcomes are real.
Escalation thresholds and Ed25519-signed approval. The evidence a regulator asks for exists by construction.
# no account needed to start
curl -X POST https://api.authoxi.com/signup \
-d '{"name": "Acme Robotics"}'
# → { "secret_key": "sk_live_…" }Every one of these is what the suites in this repository actually report, re-derived on each build. The fleet in the ledger above is sample data.
Design partners
Design partners get the gate, the signed evidence and a direct line to the people building it. One field — we will not make you fill in a form to find out what this costs.
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